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Managed Trade, Trade liberalisation and Local Pollution 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The current paper addresses the relationship between trade and endogenous pollution levels. The main 
focus is quite different from the previous literature. The mechanism linking pollution and trade is that trade 
provides the home government with a credible threat that helps motivate domestic firms to adopt cleaner 
technologies. This credible threat comes from the fact that the government has a greater incentive to protect 
a clean industry than to protect a very polluting one. In that sense, the existence of trade helps reduce 
domestic pollution compared to what would prevail in a situation of autarky.  On the other hand, a 
commitment to free trade would be counterproductive: it limits the government ‘s ability to credibly 
threaten its domestic firms. In fact we show that any trade liberalisation hurts the welfare of the home 
country.  In terms of world welfare, moderate trade liberalisation is helpful but only as long as it does no 
affect the technology choices of the firms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades economists and environmentalists have tried to 
disentangle the complex linkages between environmental and trade policies to 
assess the likely effects of free(r) trade on the environment.  The 
environmentalists ‘ great fear is that an expansion of international trade might 
lead to a systematic increase in pollution through an increase in economic 
activity, the location choices of multinational corporations and/or the weakening 
of national environmental policies.  These concerns are the subject of a large 
economics literature1. 
  
 Our paper also addresses the relationship between trade and 
endogenous pollution levels but we take a different perspective. Rather than ask 
how more trade is likely to affect the environment, we examine the effects of the 
type commitment to free(r) trade that generally emerges from multilateral trade 
negotiations.  We do this in a partial equilibrium model with local pollution.  As 
several of the more polluting industries (e.g. mining, chemicals) are best 
characterized as oligopolies, models of trade that allow for market power appear 
especially well-suited to this kind of analysis.  
 
                                                          
1Papers on the topic differ mostly according to whether pollution is strictly local or spills 
across borders, whether firms are allowed to choose an abatement technology, whether the 
location of production is endogenous and according to the set of policy tools considered.  See 
Copeland and Taylor (1994 and 2001) and Grossman and Krueger (1991) for seminal 
contributions in a general equilibrium framework. For partial equilibrium analysis, see Markusen 
et al. (1995), who examine the location decision of (polluting) firms as well as Conrad (1993), 
Barret (1994) and Kennedy (1994), where environmental policies are used to affect the 
international competitiveness of local firms.  See Karp et al. (2001) for a recent review of the 
literature.  
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There are many papers on the strategic interaction between oligopolistic 
firms and governments in an international context. Spencer and Brander (1983), 
Brander and Spencer(1983) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) show how 
governments can improve national welfare by committing to trade policies that 
modify the strategic interaction between firms. In such models, where policies 
are set before firms make their own choices, governments essentially ‘lend’ their 
commitment power to their home firms, helping them to ensure a more 
advantageous position.  This type of models has also been used to discuss how 
environmental policies can affect the competitiveness of home firms (see Conrad 
(1993), Barret(1994), Kennedy (1994) and Ulph (1996)).  We depart from this 
traditional approach by assuming that governments have limited commitment 
power.  More precisely we consider, as is traditional, that governments can 
choose their trade policies before firms choose their output levels but we also 
allow the firms to choose the type of production technology that they will use 
before trade policies can be committed to.  The main rationale for this is that 
technology adoption can be argued to be less easily reversible than trade policy 
choices. In that sense, our timing is similar to the model of Brander and Spencer 
(1987), where multinational firms choose whether to serve a market through 
exports or DFI before the host government can commit to levels of trade 
protection or local taxation. 
 
In our model, the mechanism linking pollution and trade is that trade 
provides the home government with a credible threat that helps motivate 
domestic firms to adopt cleaner technologies.2  This credible threat comes from 
the fact that the government has a greater incentive to protect a clean industry 
than to protect a polluting one. Unless the government controls other perfectly 
efficient instruments to affect the firms’ technological choices, this threat is 
                                                          
2 The basic idea is therefore related to Matsuyama (1990), where the government uses the threat of trade 
liberalisation to induce efficiency – enhancing investments by domestic firms.  However, Matsuyama ‘s set 
up is much more complex as the timing of both the government and the firms ‘ decisions is endogenous. 
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useful. In that sense, the existence of trade helps reduce domestic pollution 
compared to what would prevail in a situation of autarky.  On the other hand, a 
commitment to free trade would be counterproductive: it removes the 
government ‘s ability to credibly threaten lower levels of protection and 
decreases, therefore, the domestic firms ‘ incentives to invest in cleaner 
production methods. 
 
 This basic insight is analysed in the simplest possible two-country partial 
equilibrium model, presented in section 2, where we show how ‘ex post’ trade 
policy provides incentives to invest in pollution-reducing technologies. The effect 
of trade liberalisation on home and world welfare is analysed in sections 3 and 4.  
Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results and a few extensions. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
There are two countries, ‘Home’ and ‘Foreign’.  Each country has one firm that 
produces in its country of origin. The home firm is indexed as firm 1, while firm 2 
is the foreign firm. These firms sell a homogenous good that can be produced at 
a constant marginal (and average) cost of c, which we will set equal to zero.  
Two production technologies are available, one clean, one dirty. The dirty 
technology generates local pollution, while the clean technology does not.  The 
welfare cost of this pollution is proportional to local output, i.e. the social cost 
pollution at Home is: 
 
θq1 if the home firm uses the dirty technology 
  0 if the home firm adopts the dirty technology 
 
 5
,where q1 is the output of the home firm and θ ≥ 0.  We assume that the home 
firm is initially endowed with the dirty technology but can adopt the clean 
technology at a fixed cost of F. 
 
 In order to concentrate on the new effect presented in this paper, we  
assume that the choice of technology does not affect the marginal cost of 
production.  If it did then policies aimed at reducing production would also affect 
the ‘aggressiveness’ of the domestic firms.  Such well-known ‘strategic trade’ 
effects would make computations messier without adding anything new to the 
analysis.   
 
 We will initially focus on the home market where the inverse demand for 
the homogenous good takes the simplest possible linear form: 
 
QP −= 1  
 
,where Q = q1 + q2 is total industry output and P is the price in the domestic 
market.  Trade policy takes the form of a unit tariff t. We assume that the home 
country is the only one with an active trade policy3.   
  
The benchmark is a situation where the home country is free to set its tariff 
at any level that it pleases.  In such a  ‘freely managed trade’ regime, the timing 
of the game is as follows.  In the first stage the domestic firm must decide 
whether to keep its current polluting technology or to adopt the new, cleaner, 
technology.  Once the adoption decision is made, the home government chooses 
the level of its import tariff. There is then a third stage where firms 
simultaneously choose their levels of output.  As discussed in the introduction, 
the order of the three stages reflects the assumption that the government has 
                                                          
3 See Gallegos (2003) for a discussion of the case with two active governments.  As this extension does not 
add any significant new insight, it is omitted here. 
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only limited commitment power: while it might be able to commit to a specific 
level of tariff before firms actually compete in the product market, the choice of 
tariff is more easily reversible than the firm ‘s choice of technology. A similar 
timing can be found in Brander and Spencer (1987) ‘ s analysis of FDI.  This 
game is solved for its unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
 
Starting from the managed trade benchmark, we will then consider the 
effects of ‘trade liberalisation’, which is modelled as a legally binding upper limit 
on the level of tariff that the government can choose in stage 2. We will also 
consider the extreme case of a commitment to free trade, where the home 
government completely forgo the use of trade policy.  This means that t = 0 
even if the optimal tariff t* were to be negative (which would occur for θ > 1). 
In this case, the second stage of the game becomes irrelevant.4
 
The equilibrium quantities of the two firms in the third stage of the game are 
easily obtained as:  
 
3
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, where t is the per unit import tariff chosen by the home government in stage 2. 
To ensure an interior solution we need –1 < t < ½. The corresponding tariff 
revenue is: 
 
3
)21(*
2
tttqT −==  
 
                                                          
4 A commitment to free trade is therefore a special case of trade liberalisation, where the upper bound on t 
is smaller or equal to Min[0,(1-θ)/3].  
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The equilibrium profit of the domestic firm, domestic consumer surplus and 
domestic welfare are: 
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We can now consider the second stage of the game.  Under freely managed 
trade, the optimal tariff is obtained by maximising W with respect to t.  This 
yields: 
 
3
1)(* θθ −=t  
 
In the absence of pollution, this tariff is positive5.  Crucially for our 
argument, the tariff is lower, the greater the pollution parameter θ is. For the 
domestic firm, this means that adopting a cleaner technology is “rewarded” by 
stronger ex post protection. As the domestic firm anticipates this reward, the 
home country ‘s ability to freely choose its trade policy ex post increases the 
domestic firm ‘s incentive to invest in the new technology in stage 1.  This is 
confirmed by substituting the expression for the optimal tariff into the 
equilibrium profits of the home firm: 
                                                          
55 It is also smaller than ½ for all possible values of θ so that we are sure that the output of the foreign firm 
will always be positive in equilibrium. 
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The domestic firm ‘s incentives to invest in the non-polluting technology 
are therefore given by: 
 
81111
)8()()0(* * θθθππ −=−≡B  
, where π(0) is the firm ‘s profit when it has chosen the clean technology. It is 
useful to replace t by its optimal value in a number of other variables.  We get: 
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ariff 
stic firm 
has no incentive to adopt the less polluting technology: adoption is costly and 
offers 
nvestment costs for which the technology would be adopted 
under managed trade corresponds to all positive values lower than B1. It is 
shown
Let us now consider the effect of less extreme trade liberalisation.  Define 
the maximum tariff allowed as . Clearly, liberalisation has no effect if it is not 
q
 
so that, to ensure interior solutions, we will assume that θ < 4. Notice
that, under this assumption, B1 is always positive.  Hence, the ex post t
policy that emerges under ‘managed trade’ provides the domestic firm with 
greater incentives to invest in the cleaner technology than if the home 
government had committed to free trade. Under free trade, the dome
no benefit since the ex post tariff is set equal to zero anyway. 
 
The range of i
 on figure 1.  
−
binding, i.e. if 
 
t
3
1*− .  On the other hand, any trade liberalisation that )0( ==≥ θtt
wers the maximum allowed tariff below 1/3 will decrease the domestic firm ‘s lo
 9
incentive to adopt the clean technology.  For ]
3
1),
3
1,0[max( θ−∈−t , liberalisation 
reduces the protection granted after adoption while it leaves the protection level 
without adoption unchanged.  If pollution is not too intense (i.e. θ < 1), there is 
a further range of liberalisation where ]
3
1,0[ θ−∈−t , for which all incentives to 
switch to the cleaner technology are eliminated.  We can therefore state the 
following proposition: 
 
 
Proposition 1: Any binding trade liberalisation lowers the domestic firm ‘s 
incentives to invest in cleaner technology.  In par icular, incentives to invest in 
cleaner technology are higher under managed trade than under free trade.  
t
 
 
3. Home Country ‘s Welfare 
 
 The fact that private incentives to choose cleaner technologies are 
enhanced by managed trade does not of course guarantee that these 
technological choices are optimal from the point of view of the home country.  
To compare private and social incentives to adopt the cleaner technology we 
must compare B1 to the change in the home country ‘s welfare that is triggered 
by a move to the new technology. This change is given by: 
 
)(*1
*
1
** θθπ qFTCSW +−∆+∆+∆=∆  
, where ∆x refers to the difference between the value of x when the clean 
technology is adopted – and the tariff set accordingly – and the value of x when 
the firm chooses to use the dirty technology The first term represents the 
effect on consumer surplus.  This is unambiguously negative as the adoption of a 
cleaner technology leads to greater levels of protection and, therefore, a higher 
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domestic price. The last term corresponds to the decrease in pollution levels and 
is therefore positive. The third term represents the firm ‘s private incentives to 
adopt the cleaner technology (i.e. it is equal to B1).  As we have just seen, this is 
positive.  Anyway, as ∆π - F is fully taken into account by the domestic firm, 
these terms do not affect a comparison of private and social incentives.  Finally, 
the change in tariff revenues can a priori be either positive or negative. 
 
 Our interest lies in the difference between ∆W and B1: 
 
]8[
162
7)()( *1
**
1 θθθθ −=+∆+∆=−−∆ qTCSFBW  
 
, which is positive for all relevant values of the pollution parameter (i.e. θ < 4), 
and negative for high values of θ. This means that there are values of F for 
which adoption of the clean technology is desirable but does not happen but 
there are no values of F for which socially undesirable adoption is observed. This 
is shown in Figure 2 and summarised in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: Freely managed trade provides incentives for the adoption of the 
clean technology but these incentives are insufficient from the point of view of 
the home country overall welfare 
 
 This result immediately suggests that managed trade always yields higher 
domestic welfare than free trade or, indeed than any binding level of trade 
liberalisation (i.e. 
3
1<−t ).   
 
 If trade liberalisation does not change the adoption behaviour of the 
domestic firm then it cannot increase the home country ‘s welfare. If the 
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domestic firm invests in the clean technology anyway, any value of below 
_
t
3
1
 
simply prevents the domestic government from setting its ex post optimal tariff.  
If the home firm sticks with the dirty technology anyway then any  above 
−
t
3
1 θ−
 
does not affect welfare since the ex post optimal tariff can still be chosen.  On 
the other hand, further liberalisation bringing below 
−
t
3
1 θ−
, would force the 
country to set a sub-optimal tariff ex post, lowering its welfare. 
 
Let us now consider a level of trade liberalisation that would change the 
technology choice of the domestic firm. From proposition 1 we know that trade 
liberalisation cannot increase the firm ‘s incentives to adopt the clean technology.  
Hence we only have to analyse the case where the firm would adopt under freely 
managed trade but would not after trade has been liberalised. Define the level of 
tariff below which the firm ceases to invest in the clean technology as 
−
t c. 
Consider a trade liberalisation such that 
−− < tt c.  Since the firm already has 
insufficient incentives to invest, such liberalisation can only be welfare 
decreasing: the country reacts to any tariff bound just below the critical level 
−
t c 
by choosing its optimal ‘no adoption’ ex post tariff 
3
1 θ−=t .  As > 0, we 
know that this yield a level of welfare that is lower than when the country can 
induce adoption and set its ex post tariff equal to 
1BW −∆
3
1
.  Hence we can state: 
 
Proposition 3: Trade liberalisation can never increase domestic welfare.  
 
The evolution of domestic welfare as the upper bound on tariff is 
tightened is summarised in figure 3.  Figure 3.a. corresponds to an initial 
situation of insufficient adoption (region A in figure 2).  As explained above, 
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trade liberalisation has no effect on the home country ‘s welfare until the 
maximum tariff reaches 
3
1 θ−
. Further liberalisation beyond this point decreases 
welfare. Figure 3b is drawn for an initial point in region B of figure 2.  As soon as 
liberalisation becomes binding, it decreases home welfare.  This decrease 
continues up to the point where the firm no longer adopts the clean technology.  
At this point, welfare can in principle jump up or down. This depends on whether 
welfare without adoption and an optimal ex post tariff of 
3
1 θ−
 is higher or lower 
than welfare with adoption an a constrained tariff equal to c
−
t . If welfare jumps 
up, we still know that it remains lower than without trade liberalisation: in region 
B adoption with an unconstrained tariff is better than no adoption with an 
unconstrained tariff.  Further liberalisation does not affect welfare until  reaches 
−
t
3
1 θ−
, at which point further decreases in are welfare - decreasing.  
−
t
 
While we have focused on the issue of trade liberalisation, it should be 
clear that, in our model, autarky is never optimal either. To see this, notice that 
autarky, just like trade with 
−− ≤ tt c, never induces adoption of the clean 
technology. If there is no adoption, the home country does best by setting its ex 
post optimal tariff of 
3
1 θ−
. As this tariff is not prohibitive, it must, by definition, 
yield higher home welfare than autarky. Hence, some amount of trade 
liberalisation is always preferable to autarky. A similar argument holds when 
adoption would occur under freely managed trade and would be socially optimal 
(region B in figure 2): if managed trade is better than the best possible regime 
without adoption and adoption is desirable than managed trade must be better 
than autarky.  
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Proposition 4: There always exists a degree of trade liberalisation for which the 
home country ‘s welfare is greater than under autarky.  Autarky is also 
dominated by freely managed trade.   
 
4. World Welfare 
 World welfare differs from the home country ‘s welfare in two respects: it 
includes the profits of the foreign firm as well as the pollution associated with 
foreign production.  Because of this second term, we cannot evaluate world 
welfare without making some assumption about the technology used by the 
foreign firm.  In the first part of this section, we will simply assume that the 
foreign firm is using the clean technology so that foreign pollution is not an 
issue. In the second part we will look at the opposite case where the foreign firm 
uses the dirty technology so that foreign pollution further complicates the 
analysis 
 
 
a. ‘Clean’ Foreign Firm 
 
Adoption of the clean technology by the home firm leads to higher tariff 
levels ex post, thereby reducing the equilibrium profits of the foreign firm.  Since 
these profits are the difference between world welfare and home welfare, 
adoption must be less desirable from the world point of view than from the 
viewpoint of the home country alone. We cannot therefore a priori rule out that 
there might be values of the parameters for which the domestic firm ‘s  private 
decision to adopt the clean technology might actually reduce world welfare.  
World welfare is given by: 
 
81
)85)(4(** *1
θθθ −−=−= qQPW w  
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This means that, from the point of view of the world as a whole, adoption of the 
clean technology by the home firm is desirable if and only if: 
 
0
81
)837(
81
)85)(4(
81
20 ≥−−=−−−−=∆ FFW w θθθθ  
 
Comparing this to the private adoption incentives of he home firm we have: 
 
81
)729(
1
θθ −=−∆ BW w  
Since this expression is positive for all θ ≤ 4, the firm’ s incentives to adopt 
cannot in fact ever be excessive from the point of view of world welfare. 
 
 
b. ‘Dirty’ Foreign Firm 
 
If the foreign firm relies on a dirty technology, then adoption of the clean 
technology by the home firm has an additional positive effect on world welfare. 
Adoption results in higher tariffs.  These higher tariffs reduce the output of the 
foreign firm and the corresponding foreign pollution.  Since incentives to adopt 
were already insufficient in the presence of a ‘clean’ foreign firm, they still are 
when the foreign firm itself contributes to overall pollution. 
 
Proposition 5: Freely managed trade provides incentives for the adoption of the 
clean technology but these incentives are insufficient from the point of view of 
the worldl welfare 
 
The qualitative effect of trade liberalisation on world welfare does not 
depend on whether or not the foreign firm pollutes.  The general pattern is 
shown in figure 5. To the right of the critical tariff level 
−
t c, the clean technology 
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is adopted.  For all [
3
1,[ ctt
−−∈ , the home country will set the maximum tariff 
allowed.  Hence world welfare decreases as increases.  For 
−
t
3
1≥−t , the home 
country chooses its ex post optimal tariff and world welfare remains constant.  
To the left of the critical tariff, the domestic firm sticks to its dirty technology.  
For all values of  between 
−
t
3
1 θ−
 and , the home country chooses the ex post 
optimal tariff 
ct
−
3
1 θ−=t  and world welfare is constant over this range.  As further 
liberalisation decreases the level of tariffs without further affecting technology 
choice, it also increases world welfare.  
 
We must still discuss the relative ‘height’ of the different segments of the 
welfare function in figure 4. We know that, whenever adoption happens and the 
home country ‘s optimal ex post tariff is chosen, world welfare is higher than 
when the clean technology is not adopted and the home country chooses its ex 
post optimal tariff.  This means that the horizontal segment to the right of 
must lie higher than the horizontal segment to the left.  On the other hand, 
the relative position of the rightmost horizontal segment and the level of welfare 
under free trade is not a priori clear.  Welfare under free trade is: 
ct
−
 
9
32)0( 2
θθ −==wfW  
if the foreign firm does not pollute and  
 
9
)31(2)( 2
θθθ −==wfW  
if it does. The corresponding levels of welfare under freely managed trade are 
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with a clean foreign firm and  
 
F−−
9
20 θ
 
with a dirty one. 
 
 It is straightforward to show that, irrespective of the foreign firm ‘s 
technology, , i.e. the cost of investment F which is just large 
enough to make free trade as attractive as freely managed trade is larger than 
the maximum cost investment that the home firm is willing to shouldered.  This 
implies that world welfare under freely managed trade must be larger than under 
free trade. Moreover, figure 4 clearly shows that welfare is maximised at . 
Hence we can state: 
1BFWW
w
f
w
m >+−
ctt
−− =
 
Proposition 6: World welfare is higher under freely managed trade than under
free trade.  Still a moderate trade liberalisation that constrains the home country 
tariff without preventing the adoption of the clean technology by the home firm 
improves world welfare. 
 
 
 
5. Robustness 
 
 In this section we briefly discuss the robustness of our results to four 
kinds of extensions: more firms, more general demands, other models of 
oligopoly and the availability of other policy instruments.   
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a.  More Firms, More General Demands and Other Models of Oligopoly 
 
The conclusion that the domestic firms ‘ incentives to adopt the clean technology 
are larger under freely managed trade than under free trade (or partial 
liberalisation) holds under quite general conditions. Define θi as firm i ‘ s pollution 
parameter. Firm i ‘ s incentives to clean up its technology is determined by: 
i
i
i
i
d
dt
dt
d
d
d
θ
π
θ
π *
*
=  
reflecting the fact that firm i ‘s technological choice only affects its profits 
through its effect on the ex post optimal tariff.  As we can see, our main result 
depends on two effects.   
 
Firstly we need an increase in the cleanliness of a firm ‘s technology to 
result in a higher ex post tariff (i.e. dt*/dθI < 0) .  Let us write the country ‘s 
welfare as  
∑
≠
−−++=
n
ij
jjii tqtqtntqtntCSW )()()()(**)( θθπ  
, where n* is the number of foreign firm, n is the number of domestic firm and θi 
is the degree of dirtiness of firm I ‘ s technology. The value of t* is therefore 
determined by 
)(')(')(')(*'*)(**)(' tqtqtntqtntqntCS
dt
dW n
ij
jjii ∑
≠
−−+++= θθπ  
Hence, 
2
2
)('*
dt
Wd
tq
d
dt i
i
−−=θ  
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, which is negative in for all models of oligopoly where a firm ‘s output expands 
when some of its rivals are hit by a per unit tax.6   
 
The second effect that we need in order to reach our conclusion is simply 
that the domestic firm benefits from a higher tariff (i.e. dπi/dt* > 0) .  As a tariff 
just shifts the residual demand of the domestic industry out, this effect arises in 
every common model of oligopolistic competition. 
 
  The precise welfare results that we obtain are much less robust.  They 
might well change if different functional forms were used. Crucially we cannot be 
certain that the domestic firm ‘s incentives to adopt the new technology will 
always fall short of the associated benefits for its home country or for the world 
as a whole. If they did not, then there would be a range of parameters for which 
adoption would occur even though it would not be welfare maximising.  In such 
a case one can show that trade liberalisation that is drastic enough to discourage 
adoption would in fact increase welfare.  Moreover such a ‘drastic’ level of trade 
liberalisation would always exist.  This argument is sketched briefly below. 
 
 Suppose that, with different functional forms, we obtained a range of 
parameters for which the domestic firm would adopt the clean technology even 
though home welfare would be higher if it stuck with the dirty technology.  The 
effect of trade liberalisation on the welfare of the home country could then be 
                                                          
6 This will be true in most of the oligopoly models used in trade theory. In any model of 
quantity competition with downward sloping reaction functions, the tariff shifts the 
reaction functions of foreign firms in, resulting in larger equilibrium output for all 
(symmetric) domestic firms. In a model of price competition with differentiated products 
and upward sloping reaction functions, the tariff shifts the reaction functions of the 
foreign firms out.  This results in higher equilibrium prices for all firms but the prices of 
domestic firm increases less than the prices of foreign firm.  Using stability conditions, 
one can show that the output of each (symmetric) domestic firm actually increases (see 
Vives (1999). 
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represented in the following graph.  The graph is very similar to figure 3b.  So is 
the reasoning involved. 
 Starting from unrestricted managed trade, a progressive tightening of , 
leaves home welfare unchanged until it reaches the ex post optimal tariff given 
that the cleaner technology has been adopted, defined as t
−
t
n* (i.e. 
3
1
 in our linear 
demand example).  For  between   and t
−
t ct
−
n*, adoption still takes place but the 
home country cannot set its preferred tariff ex post.  Hence home welfare 
decreases.  As in figure 4b. trade liberalisation that moves   below  prevents 
the adoption of the new technology.  Since technology adoption was undesirable 
even if the tariff could be set at t
−
t ct
−
n*, avoiding adoption when the tariff is capped 
below tn* must increase domestic welfare.  Moreover, domestic welfare must 
jump to a level that is higher than when t≥−t n* . Domestic welfare remains at 
this level as long as  remains higher than the ex post optimal tariff in the 
absence of adoption, defined as t
−
t
o* (equal to 
3
1 θ−
 in our linear example).  
Tightening the tariff cap beyond this level is again welfare decreasing.  Overall 
then, the home country ‘s welfare is maximised by committing to a tariff cap that 
lies between to* and . We can then conclude that when freely managed trade 
results in undesirable adoption of the new technology, moderate trade 
liberalisation – sufficient to prevent adoption but leaving the country free to set 
its ex post optimal tariff – unambiguously increases the home country ‘s welfare. 
ct
−
 
Essentially, trade liberalisation helps the home country credibly commit 
not to ‘reward’ the home firm for the adoption of the new technology. As 
incentives to adopt disappear at a tariff rate that is above the ex post optimal 
tariff rate without adoption, a suitable tariff cap can eliminate undesirable 
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adoption without affecting the level of domestic welfare in the non-adoption 
outcome. 
 
 
b.  Other Instruments 
 
 As presented, the analysis is obviously vulnerable to the introduction of 
other policy instruments.  In fact, a government who could commit to paying a 
lump sum subsidy S to domestic firms adopting the clean technology and who 
could finance this costlessly would always be able to induce adoption of the clean 
technology whenever this is socially desirable. On the other hand, unless lump 
sum taxes on pollution-reducing investments were also contemplated (this seems 
politically difficult), the government would not be able to avoid excessive 
adoption.  In that case, as we have just seen, trade liberalisation would remain 
useful. 
 
 More importantly, subsidies cannot usually be financed costlessly.  If one 
assumes that each unit of subsidy involves a social cost of (1+λ), with λ ≥ 0, 
then our analysis remains quite relevant.  As the subsidy is now costly, the 
government will choose the smallest possible subsidy that induces the desirable 
adoption behaviour.  Hence the optimal size of the subsidy depends precisely on 
the type of analysis that we have conducted.  Referring to figure 2, any 
parameter combination in region B would call for S = 0. As the change in the ex 
post optimal tariff suffices to induce the (desirable) adoption of the clean 
technology and the ex post optimal tariff tn* = 
3
1
 will be imposed whether or not 
subsidies are given, using subsidies would be a waste of resources.  For any 
combination of parameters in region A, the only sensible subsidy is one that is 
just sufficient to induce adoption given the reward that will be granted anyway 
through the optimal post-adop ion increase in tarif , i.e. S = F –  Bt f 1. If λ is small 
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enough than this subsidy should indeed be used.  For λ large enough the home 
country is better off relying exclusively on the ex post tariff mechanism that we 
have analysed. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
The main point of this paper is very simple.  In the presence of local 
pollution, a home government will protect its industry from foreign competition 
more if its domestic firms use a clean production technology.  The anticipation of 
this ex post optimal trade policy gives domestic firms incentives to adopt 
clean(er) technologies in the first place.  The ability to set an unconstrained tariff 
ex post is therefore valuable as an instrument to foster pollution-reducing 
investments.  Countries that enter binding agreements limiting their ability to set 
tariffs might therefore lose a valuable tool to protect their environment.  In that 
sense, a commitment to free trade can hurt the environment. 
 
Whether the use of ex post tariffs provides adequate incentives for the 
adoption of cleaner technologies is less clear.  With linear demand and Cournot 
duopoly, we show that the incentives provided are in fact insufficient.  It follows 
that a commitment to trade liberalisation never increases domestic (or world) 
welfare. In fact, trade liberalisation that is drastic enough unambiguously 
decreases the welfare of the home country.  In a more general setting, one 
cannot rule out the possibility that ex post tariffs provide domestic firms with 
excessive incentives to clean up their act.  In such a case moderate trade 
liberalisation increases the country ‘s welfare. 
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 Figure 1: Private Incentives to Adopt the Clean Technology 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Private Incentives to Adopt  
and Home Country Welfare 
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Figure 3.a. 
 
 
Figure 3b. 
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 Figure 4: Trade Liberalisation and World Welfare 
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